The First World War

Chapter 1 begins by summarizing the enormous costs of a war that did not, in the author’s opinion, need to be fought. It claimed the lives of 10 million people, traumatized a generation, and laid the groundwork for a second and even more destructive world war a mere 20 years later. It brought about violence and suffering on a scale and scope unprecedented in European history. The untold number of corpses left on the battlefields gave rise to the concept of the “unknown soldier” as a symbolic figure of national renown, and Hitler would describe himself as an unknown soldier in his rise to power. Even though no large cities were destroyed and the suffering of civilians was relatively mild (certainly compared to the Second World War), and European populations eventually returned to prewar levels, the war inflicted incalculable damage on European civilization, giving way to totalitarian regimes in Spain, Germany, Italy, and Russia. It exposed wounds that festered long enough to plunge Europe into war yet again, often on the exact same battlefields as before. While the combatants of the latter conflict approached it with a grim awareness of what to expect, the people who went to war in 1914 had no concept of what they were about to endure.

Europe on the eve of World War I was closely integrated due to technologies in manufacturing and transport that made international trade and investment significantly cheaper. Many believed the states of Europe were so dependent on one another for their economic prosperity that war between them was an “impossibility” (10). Economic integration fueled efforts to foster cooperation and codify international law, such as the 1899 Hague Conference, which banned aerial bombardment, poison gases, and soft-point bullets. The royal families of Europe were closely connected, often by marriage or blood, although the multilateral diplomatic institutions that had sprung up after the Napoleonic Wars had fallen into obsolescence. And despite efforts to promote international peace, the European powers were highly militarized, with Germany attempting to build a fleet to match Britain and France raising up an army to match Germany.

Disputes, such as those over colonial possessions, were resolved not by “the process of international arbitration [as] suggested by the discussions at the Hague in 1899” (19) but by the powers themselves. Militaries championed the superiority of the offense, believing masses of infantry with the support of heavy artillery could achieve a decisive battlefield result. All the major powers on the Continent conscripted young men into military service and then placed them in reserve after the completion of their active service. The armies of the various powers were similarly constructed around the division of roughly 12,000 soldiers and 72 heavy guns, but radio communication between infantry and artillery was underdeveloped. This deficiency was indicative of a broader problem, wherein Europe’s political and military leaders could not manage the forces they ostensibly controlled.

Chapter 2 explains how the European powers prepared for war in a strikingly different way than in previous wars. Historically, plans were an immediate response to the threat or outbreak of war, and managing logistics often called for flexibility and adaptation. With the development of railways, plans for deploying and supplying armies were now on rigid timetables, as one mistake along the line could disrupt the entire operation. In the preceding decades, armies developed general staffs, with officers trained at staff colleges, to master the complexities of moving huge armies across vast distances. General staffs kept their plans closely guarded from civilian oversight, and so there was no coordination between the technical aspects of military strategy and the overall diplomatic purpose they might serve. The most famous of the prewar war plans was the Schlieffen Plan, which Keegan regards as one of the most important documents of the 20th century due to the German army’s eventual decision to utilize it in the summer of 1914.

The brainchild of Alfred von Schlieffen, the chief of the German General Staff, the plan centered around the assumption that Germany would likely face a two-front war with both France and Russia. The plan derived from Helmuth von Moltke, who envisioned a defensive posture against France and an attack into Russian-controlled Poland with no further advance into Russia. Schlieffen changed the plan to make its first phase a decisive victory against France on its own territory. It envisioned a German army violating Belgian neutrality to circumvent France’s formidable network of fortresses, follow the Somme and Meuse rivers, and then turn southward, dividing into two wings so as to surround and destroy the French army. From that point the Germans would turn their focus eastward and defend against a Russian army that was presumably slow to mobilize.

Schlieffen spent years tinkering with the plan but struggled to solve a fundamental logistical problem: There were not enough roads to bring an army of sufficient force to the presumed site of the decisive battle. Adding soldiers would just pack them in even more tightly. The offensive power of an army tends to diminish as it extends, as more soldiers stay behind to provide guard duty or shield an exposed flank. But without enough troops, a decisive victory will not happen and a brutal war of attrition will ensue. Neither Schlieffen nor Moltke the Younger (the nephew of the other Moltke), who was in charge of the General Staff upon the outbreak of the war, ever managed to solve the dilemma, but they went forward with the plan anyway.

France’s war plan, Plan XVII, proposed a direct assault into the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine, which had been annexed by Germany following its crushing victory over France in 1871. This was the last thing the Germans expected, as the provinces were now heavily fortified, and earlier French plans had been more defensive. France wanted to maximize the size of its army to achieve parity with the more populous Germany, but the larger the active army, the fewer reserves France would be able to call upon. Under Chief of Staff Joseph Joffre, France decided an offensive was the best way to maximize their manpower advantages before Germany’s superior reserves could be deployed. Belgium had refused to coordinate with France against a potential German invasion, inhibiting French plans for a fight in Belgium, but they could still expect British support to guard their frontier with Belgium should the Germans attack in that direction (as they later would).

An attack against Germany was almost meant to give the Russians time to mobilize while also communicating the need for moving as quickly as they could. Russia’s capabilities and will remained uncertain after having suffered defeat against Japan and domestic upheaval in 1905. By 1913, Russia had promised to attack Germany with half of its army within 15 days of mobilizing. Germany wanted its ally Austria-Hungary to concentrate its own strength against Russia and feared Austria-Hungary would become distracted by a conflict with Serbia, which threatened Austrian power in the Balkans. Moltke promised Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Austrian chief of staff, Germany would support an Austrian offensive against Russia, which contradicted the Schlieffen Plan’s premise of defense in the East while awaiting victory in the West. The last remaining variable for Germany was whether and how Britain might intervene following a violation of Belgian neutrality, Belgium having been required to remain neutral since 1839. The British planned on deploying six divisions to threaten Germany’s right flank, but Britain also had the unique luxury of choosing the time and place of its involvement. All of the Continental states believed they had to act first or else suffer defeat in mid-mobilization, and there was no diplomatic setting in which to counter the mechanistic logic of the general staffs. Governments themselves lacked the sophistication for the people in charge, especially the autocrats of Germany, Russia, and Austria, to understand or manage the military bureaucracy.